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A REAPPRAISAL OF RETAIL
PRICE CUTTING STRATEGIES:
OPPORTUNITIES, THREATS, AND
REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
Sidney C. Bennett
Darrell F. Parker

Int roduct ion
This analysis reconsiders the dynamic pricing decisions of firms in retail
markets. Traditional economic analysis is, theoretically, able to describe the
firm's profit maximizing decision, but a significantly more difficult problem
is to provide the firm with guidelines to actually evaluate the state of a changing mari..et and choose an appropriate pricing strategy. Only after the market is properly evaluated can meaningful pricing decisions be made.
The most serious prking scenario involves a firm experiencing trouble with
sales and profits. Too often the immediate reaction is to cut prices across
the board in an effort to improve business. The measure of success actually
used for this type of strategy is, typically, the impact on volume. Price changes
arc considered successful if revenues are increased and failures when revenues
decline. In other words, volume of business evolves as the most common
measure of performance. The problem is that volume maximization as a
strategy is likely inconsistent with and contrary to profit maximization.
The quest for revenues, or market share, is not necessarily an uncommon
nor inappropriate marketing strategy. Indeed, there are many long-accepted
mari..eting and pricing objectives other than profit (Kotler 1988, Peter and
Donnelly 1989). Most businesses claim to seek profit maximization, however,
and the final evaluation of performance usually involves some measure of
profitability. Further, any strategy based on an objective other than profit
should be carefully evaluated with respect 10 its impact on earnings 10 ensure the future viability of the firm.
The purpose of the analysis herein is to evaluate the use of price as the
firm's primary competitive weapon. Such pricing decisions are often defensive or reactionary measures in response to either changing business conditions or because of dissatisfaction with present market position. Generally,
this involves price cutting to enhance performance (most often measured in
terms of revenues).
Retail Price Cutting
The classic example of the dangers associated with a storewide price cutting strategy is the 1972 A&P Co. " WEO" (Where Economy Originates)
campaign. A&P cut prices, increased volume, and lost mill ions.(" A&P Cuts
Up" 1972, Tracy 1973). That campaign involved loweri ng prices on 900Jo
of their merchandise in order to enhance profits which had taken a down12
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turn(" A&P's Ploy" 1972). They expected the increased volume to make up
for the differences in margins. Price reductions reportedly resulted in margins between 90/o and 130Jo, compared to 210Jo before the campaign.
The "WEO" campaign resulted in a 1.0 percent increase in market share,
from 12.1 percent to 13. I percent; increased revenues, from $5.5 billion to
$6.3 billion; and a profit reversal from $14.6 million to a loss of $51.3 million (Hartley 1989). Clearly, in the A&P case, the overall price reduction
strategy worked counter to profitability although revenues and market share
were significantly increased.
More recently, Scars, Roebuck & Co. has undergone a major restructuring that includes a price-cutting strategy. This involved a store-wide reduction in prices to a level just above those normally used for deep-reduction
annual or semiannual sales (Weiner 1988). A test market of this strategy
showed a sales gain of 50 percent, which might possibly increase profits (as
analyzed below). As will be seen later, volume increases of this magnitude
are marginal as to the ability of price reductions' to increase profitability.
In fact, the stock market reacted negatively to this move, although market
analysts were divided (Weiner 1988).
These are only two examples, but both involve giant, experienced retailers. It is likely that the same pricing Mrategy is employed by thousands of
small or medium-sized retailers, with much lower visibility, who arc facing
similar volume and profit problems . The simplistic aprroach of depending
on demand elasticity to solve profit problems can be catastrophic to such
firms who lack the financial resources to weather such profit-destroying
errors.
Our primary objective is to reconsider the pricing decision within the framework of the information available to the firm. We limit our analysis to the
general price levels of competing retail establishments, however, rather than
specific products or brands. Thus, we are able to provide boundaries that
permit the retailer to distinguish ex-ante the arpropriateness of its pricing
decision. Price is too often used as the principal competitive tool when competition is perceived as draining business from the firm. Thu~, to offset a
decline in volume or to provide the competitive edge in a market, price reductions are often the first (and final) marketing solution considered. In retail
markets with differentiated products, such a simplistic price reduction solution may well be counterproductive. That is, volume goals may be achieved
at the expense of profits.
Theories of Retail Pricing
The nature of equilibrium for prices in retail markets has increasingly
gained the attention of economists. While this can be auributed in part to
the unique aspects of retail markets, the observed distribution of retail prices
presents an interesting market phenomena. Carlson and Pescatrice ( I 980)
reported significant variation in market equilibrium prices among competing retailers. They found that the standard deviation of prices in their sample of retailers exceeded IO percent of the mean item price for over half the
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commoditites in their study. Thus, theories of retail pricing must address
the persistent variation of prices among competing firms.
Explanations for this observed price dispersion ha\'e been posed in a variety of framework s. Imperfect information models with consumer search are
able to generate dispersed price equilibrium {Carlson and McAfee 1983) as
are models where firms price discriminate against uninformed consumers
(Varian 1980 & 1981, Salop and Stiglitz 1977). Both search and price discrimination models. in general, predict that the low-price store will have the
higher market share.
Thb resull does not hold when nonpricc competition is important. In contrast to the search and price discrimination models, differentiating retail establishments by location leads to the prediction that the larger market share
is associated with the high price firm (Black and Parker 1986). That is, the
s!Qre in the popular shopping mall will have higher prices and a larger market share than a 5tore in an inconvenient location.
Spatial models also generate price discrimination through freight absorption (Norman 1983). Alternatively, i5sues of diffusion, saturation, and cost
reduction due to experience have been incorporated into competitive price
dynamks (Rao and Bas\ 1985), a5 have the characteristics of the goods and
nature of the buyers (Lazcar 1986).
When price differences among retailers result from nonprice competition,
then the nature of the firm ·s market ~cgment must be considered. Whether
the target market (desired market .\egment) is essentially price sensitive,
product attribute insistent, or de5ire5 retail services, they become the mo5t
important issue~ in developing the mo,t profitable marketing ~trategy. The
exbtence of ,uch nonpricc competition and price dispersion place further
doubt on the advisability of a simplistic price-cutting strategy as a cure for
weak sales.
Product <lifferentiation influences pricing strategy when an industry experiences a doY.nturn. Any decline in bu5ines~ conditions must be e\aluated
ba\cd upon the nature of the sales decrease. A different strategy may be called
for in that case Y.hen the competitive mix of an industry changes a~ opposed
to that when the industry declines hut the relative strength of the competitors is preserved.

Sourn·s or Volunu.- lncrca,c~
The ramifications of a price cutting strategy aimed at increasing the current period'~ ~ale\ can be discussed from three vantage points. First, the firm
mu,t consider to what extent project ed increases in sale~ are believed to be
generated through gains to the industry. If the industry as a whole is experiencing a downturn, the potential for gains of this type, from primary industry
demand, may be limited. Certainly, the firm mu~t be satisfied with only a
portion of any induced increase in industry volume, generally limited to the
firm's pre~ent market share. More importantly, however, is the difficulty
of inducing additional customers into the market when the general market
climate is in a downward trend. The causes of such a trend are most likely
14

nonprice in nature. The characteristics of dispersed price equilibria will also
limit this type of gain. If the firm is not initially the low-price competitor
within the market, !hen ii is not obvious Ihat the reduction of prices by chis
single firm will induce new customers into the industry. And even ir they
are the low-price firm, the increase in quantity demanded from 1his single
segment would not likely be sufficient to justify any reasonable price
reductions.
It is likely that industry primary demand will be relatively inelastic to !he
pricing policy of a single firm. That is, the change in price by a single store
will 1101 significantly alter the distribution of prices within the indu,try. Only
1he presence of a coordinated price reduc1ion by all Firms within 1he industry will present 1he consumers with a generalized enhancemeni to primary
demand.
A second source of increased sales following a price cutting strategy is gains
from within the industry; !hat is, "selective" demand, i.e., competition for
,hare or an existing market. A realistic perception or the products' cross
elaslicities "ithin the indus1ry is perhaps the more important and n:levant
elasticity measure, particularly during periods of downturn. A demand elasticity es1imated during periods of stable market sales may mislead the firm when
the industry is in a state of flux. Pricing decisions must, therefore, focus
on the currem competitive impact within the industry to accurately evaluate
a given s1rategy. Further, the compe1itive reac1ions mmt also be considered.
Garda ( 1983) ,,arns of invoking competitive reactiom 1hat may easily evolve
into a price war, negating the initial purpose of the reduction and simply
lowering price leveh throughout the industry.
The in1er1emporal analysis or 1hc firm's own product demand 1,ill also
tie affected by any price cutting stra1egy. Any a11cmp1 to m,:asure the success of a price cutting stralegy based upon changes in the current period's
,olume of ,ale, mu,t que,tion to what nlent the~e gains are at the expense
of 1he firm's own future ~ales. Thb 11 ill be determined in part by the perception among consumers as 10 the duration of the reduced prices. If !he price
rcduc1ion is <,Cena~ a ,hort-run slrategy, !hen consumer~ will have an incentive to "buy early'' or "stock up" on 1he merchandise offered. Indeed, Weiner ( 1988) note~ that Sear, ~old 55 percenl of their good~ during sales al various
time, or the year. Thus, a "clearance ,ale" will appear to rcflccl a higher
elasticity of demand 1han a permanen1 price reduction. This analysis is necessary since a price-culling slralegy will include not only gains to primary and
secondary demand, tiut also interlernporal gains from 1hc firm's own fu1ure
sales. Hence, in evaluating the desirabili1y or success or a pricing stra1egy,
it is imponanl 10 adjus1 the elas1icity mea,urc by 1he disrnunt~d pre,enl ,aluc
of 1he lost ruturc sales.
The firm must recognize bolh the prospecl~ and limi1s associated with building a compelitive s1ra1egy based upon price culling in the presence of differentiated producls. In 1he presence of an economic downlurn and in markc1s
with dispersed price equilibria, !he likelihood of gains to primary demand
is greatly reduced. Further, the presence of inlertemporal gains from the
firms' own prospective future cuslomcr~ will resull in overestimaling the sue15

cess of a price cutting strategy. The most relevant elasticity to evaluate the
desirability of pursuing a price cutting strategy is then the cross elasticity
measure. In other words, are enough customers within the industry willing
to switch firms to justify a price reduction of some given magnitude? It is
important to recall that we are focusing on price differentials between retail
establishments, not among product brands. Our points are that the firm's
position within the industry is more readily improved by changing its distribution of prices rather than through a simplistic price cutting strategy, and
that other competitive tools are likely to be more effective than simple, reactive price reductions.
Limitation~ of Price Cutting Strategic~
The firm wishing to evaluate the potential success of a price cutting strategy
will neeJ to have a prior recognition of the necessary increases in volume
to increase profitability. The firm can then judge whether the cross elasticities of demand arc sufficient to meet the profit objectives. If the desired
volume increase cannot be obtained through business attracted from competitors within the industry, then the price cutting policy is probably not ad\ isable. As argued earlier, gains to primary Jcmand arc unlikely in markets
v.ith a disperseJ price equilibrium or in times of general industry decline.
The only other source of increased sales is at the expense of the firm's own
future demand. A natural question is: "What magnitude of sales increases
are necessary, given typical pricing structures, to be able to justify a given
price reduction?''
Numerical examples that detail the increases in volume necessary for a price
cutting strategy to also meet criteria for profit maximization are given to
clearly illustrate this pricing dilemma. Figure A shows the increase in volume
required to maintain constant gross profit when prices arc reJuccd. Since
initial margins differ in different markets and for different classes of stores,
several initial gross margin curves are shown.
These curves v.erc derived from the following relationship:
P ,Q ,M, = P,Q,M:
where P

Q

M

price
quantity sold
gross margin or markup percentage

and the subscripts refer to the initial and reduced
price.
As can be seen, a significant percentage increase in quantity is required
in order to maintain a constant level of profits. For example, a IO percent
price reduction requires a 50 percent increase in quantity when the initial
gross margin is 30 percent or a 100 percent increase in quantity wit h an initial margin of 20 percent. Even when the initial margin is 50 percent, a 25
percent increase in volume is necessary just to maintai n constant profit. These
observations are particularly relevant to most retailing operations, since markups most often range from 15 percent to perhaps 35 percent. The overall
16
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Figure A
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margins at A&P (before the WEO campaign) were estimated to be 21 percent ("A&P's Ploy" 1972).
Thus, it is easy to see how volume measures may mislead managers as to
the success of their pricing policy. A pricing policy must generate sales volume
increases that surpass the level shown in Figure A in order to be judged a
success.
This relationship can also be restated in terms of the required elasticity
coefficients that maintain constant profit; that is, the ratio of the percent
change in quantity to the percent change in price necessary to maintain gross
profits at the current level. These elasticities' are reflected in the curves
presented in Figure B. As can be seen, the large increases in quantity required
to justify a price cutting strategy stem from relatively large underlying elasticity coefficients. These numbers again serve as the lower bound for the demand elasticities which will justify the price cutting strategy.

Realistic Expectations
Empirical evidence as 10 the magnitude of volume response associated with
price cutting in retail establishments also serve to cast doubt as to whether
the changes of the magnitude shown to be required in Figures A and Bare
act ually attainable.
Litvack, Calantone, and Warshaw {1985) attempted measurement of the
responsiveness of consumers to various promotional efforts in a field experi-
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Figure B
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ment. The percent changes reporte<l within their ~urveys are sufficiently small,
in general, to fall below those leveb determined as minimal within Figure
A. This is particularly important since the only promotional efforts that they
considered were promotion\ of a short-term nature. These would almost certainly be the type of gains that are not expecte<l to be permanent price reductions, and hence, come at the e:-.pense of the firm's own future demand.
In an in-store experiment, Bennett and Will,,inson ( 1974) provide data
reflecting "elasticities" of only 2.09, 2.91, and 0.70 for motor oil, aspirin,
and flash cubes, respectively. Their study involved cross-elasticities for experimental brands of these products, and the prices \\,ere easily compared
to the prices of competing brands. One would expect lower ela~ticity coefficients if price differentials were bct',l,een store~ because of the added difficulties involved in effectively providing information to buyer~.
A comprehensive, highly-controlled, factorial-designed field experiment
by Wilkinson, Mason, and Pak soy (1982) furnishes an excellent example of
the effects of price reductions in food marketing. They experimented with
four products using three treatments (price, advertising, and shelf space) over
an 80-week period. The price treatment levels were at the regular retail price,
store cost, and halfway between the two extremes. Although the exact prices
(and amount of price change) are not given, it is estimated that, with a typical retail markup of less than 30 percent for the items selected, the incremental
price changes were under 15 percent. The average quantity increase for all
products with this price reduction was only 24.5 percent, and in 37 .5 percent
of the case!> involving regular shelf space, quantity sold actually went down
when price was decreased. A comparison of these results with the criteria
shown in Figure A clearly shows that the price reduction~ were counterproductive in terms of profitability.
While these empirical studie!> cited are a small sample, the implications
arc dear. Experimental evidence indicates that expected increases in volume
18
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with reduced prices are typically not enough to main tain the original level
o f gross profit. Even "substantial" sales increases in response to price reductions are inadequate to protect gross profit levels. This condition may be
acceptable for a small selection of products for which promotional reductions are made to attract store traffic, but only if customers buy a significant quantity of other. regular-priced products. If the price reductions are
store-wide, however, the lower prices are not justified from a profitability
perspective.

Alternative Pricing Strategies
The fact that a store-wide price cutting strategy is unlikely to improve
profitability does not mean that pricing should not be used as pare of the
firm's competitive strategy. In this section we suggest two a lternate pricing
approaches that may be appropriate when the firm is experiencing a
downturn.
In the case of a general downturn, it is recommended that the firm reassess its market position. Clearly defining the segment of the market that the
retailer can effectively serve may suggest adopting a price increase. While
a price increase will result in a loss of business, the firm can concentrate on
developing and serving its remaining customers. If a retailer begins with a
300/o initial margin, a price increase of 100/o would still allow a 25% reduction in volume to maintain the level of gross profit. Figure C illustrates this
tradeoff for various initial margins.
On the other hand, should it be determined thac price reductions are appropriate, seleccive promocional discounts may be more effective than storewide cuts. Selective promotions can be <lesigned with che supporc from other
elemencs of the marketing mix to increase their effectiveness.
Figure C
EFFECTS OF PRICE INCREASES
ON GROSS PROFITS
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Conclusions and Implications
In evaluating the appropriateness of a price-cutting st rategy, the firm must
consider the new business it wishes to attract. In other words, when evaluating if the demand elasticity is sufficiently large to generate an increase in
profitability, the firm must be precise in focusing on the relevant elasticity
measure. Expanding primary demand to any meaningful degree is unlikely
in the presence of an industry dowriturn, because the actions of a single firm
are unlikely to have any significant effect. Further, the high price elasticities
required to even maintain the lower total gross profit experienced in a downturn suggest the futility of relying on price alone to improve performance.
Such action would likely reduce gross profit even more. It would seem, then,
that price maintenance, or even a slight price increase, would be preferable,
even at the expense of volume.
In stable markets and under stable economic conditions, expected cross
elasticities \\ith regard to alternative stores (as opposed to alternative brands)
are not likely to be great enough to warrant price reductions . The fact that
there is a market equilibrium with significant price variations among competitors suggests that nonprice factors are major determinants of relative market shares. Unless a very high cross elasticity exists, nonprice competition
appears to be a better alternative in increasing volume and profitability in
stable markets.
Finally, the risk of intertemporal substitution, i.e., borrowing volume from
future sales, is significant. Short-term effects of price reduction~ may mask
the long-term consequences on both volume and profit. Thus, even if volume
increases enough to hold gross profit constant, future profib will suffer if
customers "stock up" immediately following price reductions.
Limited evidence shows that price c utting alone is unlike ly to reverse poor
business performance. Even with elastic demand, expected volume increases
are unlikely to be su ffi cient to compensate for the losses in margins. The
firm must, therefore, consider ex-ante the necessary volume increases to maintain profitability to prevent volume goals from overriding profit maximization. Nonprice competition appears to be a safer approach to improving the
firm's competitive position .

Endnote!>
' Price reductions were not the only changes affected, but they were the
major thrust to help rejuvenate the traditional retailing operation.
'The elasticities shown were computed as arc elasticities, i.e., the average
price elasticity between the initial and final price. If point elasticities had
been used, based only on the initial price, the values would have been significantly higher. Arc elasticity measures are more appropriate, however,
when large price adjustments are involved, i.e., more than ten percent change
in price.
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